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Abstract—This paper introduces the application of game the-
ory to understand noisy real-time signalling and the resulting
behavioural dynamics in microscopic populations such as bac-
teria and other cells. It presents a bridge between the fields of
molecular communication and microscopic game theory. Molecu-
lar communication uses conventional communication engineering
theory and techniques to study and design systems that use
chemical molecules as information carriers. Microscopic game
theory models interactions within and between populations of
cells and microorganisms. Integrating these two fields provides
unique opportunities to understand and control microscopic pop-
ulations that have imperfect signal propagation. Two examples,
namely bacteria quorum sensing and tumour cell signalling, are
presented with potential games to demonstrate the application of
this approach. Finally, a case study of bacteria resource sharing
demonstrates how noisy signalling can alter the distribution of
behaviour.
Index Terms—Game theory, diffusion, quorum sensing, molec-
ular communication
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, communication engineers have applied math-
ematics and signal processing to design and understand com-
munication networks. By controlling the end-to-end com-
munication process, engineers have built and continue to
design systems that are fast, efficient, and reliable. However,
communication system design is not exclusive to engineers.
Nature has also evolved many strategies for living things to
signal each other and share information.
While it is common knowledge that many species (including
ourselves) have natural methods to communicate, some of
us may not appreciate the extensiveness and complexity of
communication in the microscopic domain, nor the important
role it plays, in both our evolution and our everyday health.
Signals are being regularly transmitted within and between
individual cells and microorganisms. These signals may not
be sending packets of data in the conventional communication
sense, but nevertheless they enable conventional communica-
tion applications such as sensing, coordination, and control.
Thus, we can adapt conventional communication engineering
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theory and techniques to study these signalling mechanisms
and understand how they work.
An emerging research field in this direction is molec-
ular communication, which considers the use of chemical
molecules as information carriers and where traditional com-
munication engineering does not directly apply; see [1]. The
growth of this field has been primarily driven by two factors.
The first is the ubiquitous use of molecules by cells and
microorganisms. The second is the incredible potential to
use molecules in new devices and networks where traditional
communication designs are not suitable, such as for fighting
neurological diseases or for sending messages within microflu-
idic chips. Recent and promising related work includes [2],
where synthetic cells were generated that could communicate
with P. aeruginosa.
An engineer typically expects that a transmitter and a
receiver will function as designed. However, unlike modern
wireless networks and other communication systems, engi-
neers have less top-down control over systems that include
cells and microorganisms. Reasons for this include the limited
intelligence of individual cells and the presence of distinct
sources of noise. The strength of noise sources, including
molecular diffusion and chemical reaction kinetics, are often
time-varying and signal-dependent (e.g., see Fig. 1). These
characteristics lead to the following challenges:
1) If we want to communicate with a natural microorgan-
ism, such as an individual bacterium, then we are con-
strained to using (noisy) signalling mechanisms that can
propagate in microorganism environments and which
they would understand.
2) Even if signals were correctly received and detected,
we may not be able to guarantee that an individual
microorganism behaves as intended. Microorganisms do
not typically live in isolation but in diverse environments
with many species (e.g., see Fig. 2). Often, these organ-
isms are sharing signals that influence their behaviour,
yet they will have imperfect knowledge about each other.
An individual microorganism is not a rational thinker, but
it would have evolved to optimize its response to noisy
environmental signals. Thus, understanding and controlling
microscopic populations requires more than “simply” applying
communication theory principles. We must also account for
the real-time behavioural dynamics of the population, i.e., the
individuals’ responses to repeated interactions, which is the
subject of this paper.
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Fig. 1. Noisiness of a diffusion wave. Even in a stable uniform environment
without obstacles or chemical reactions, molecular diffusion is a noisy process.
The distribution of molecules observed versus time at some distance from an
instantaneous point release of molecules is shown. The colour bar on the right
is the legend for the distribution values, which add up to 1 for each sampling
time. The observed diffusion signal has a variance that is proportional to the
time-varying strength of the expected signal (solid white line).
Cell Type A
Cell Type B
Cell Type C
Fig. 2. Signalling in a diverse microscopic environment. Microscopic
environments can be home to many different species, including animal cells
(Type A) and bacterial cells (Types B and C). Different phenotypes (variations)
also express different observable traits (e.g., different shades of cell type B).
Cells of the same species commonly communicate with each other (arrows
with solid lines), but cross-species communication is also very common,
whether intended or not (arrows with dashed lines). Many examples are
reviewed in [3].
The need to predict and control behavioural dynamics
suggests the application of game theory [4]. Game theory
is a tool for understanding the interactions between rational
players whose actions (i.e., strategies) are influenced by their
perceived gains (i.e., payoffs). Unlike conventional optimiza-
tion, game theory models how players adjust their behaviour in
response to the behaviour (or anticipated behaviour) of other
players. For example, in the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma,
two criminals have an incentive to testify against each other,
even though the global optimum is for neither of them to
testify. Game theoretic models are usually described in terms
of strategies and decisions, but they are also applicable (and
arguably more so) to microbial populations, even though they
are not “rational” beings. This is precisely because their
behaviours are driven by evolution and responses to external
signals; see [5].
This paper serves as an introduction for applying game
theory to behavioural dynamics in microscopic environments
with noisy signalling. We propose integrating the ideas of
game theory for microorganisms with the communication
engineering approach from molecular communication. The
existing applications of game theory have generally focused
on evolution and not accounted for the imperfect propaga-
tion of physical signals. Studies of molecular communication
have focused on stochastic signal propagation but have not
considered behavioural dynamics. This paper seeks to bridge
this gap and demonstrate that unique insights and engineering
opportunities can result.
We focus on two systems as examples and propose real-time
games for these systems. Specifically, we consider quorum
sensing by bacteria and signalling by cancer cells. Finally,
we use bacteria signalling as a case study and present a
corresponding model for the payoffs to individual bacteria.
The model extends our preliminary work in [6] to show
that a higher population density encourages cooperation but
that selfish bacteria can also succeed in a dense environment
if there are cooperating bacteria to support them. Related
work in this area, which did not consider the control of
behavioural dynamics, includes [7]–[9]. In [7], bacteria decide
whether to form links with other bacteria and share resources.
In [8], two transmitters either compete or cooperate when
sending molecules to a common receiver. In [9], experiments
were designed to show that cooperation can be favoured by
increasing bacteria population density. Cooperation between
bacteria for carrying information is also considered in work
including [10].
Beyond this paper, our long term objective is to design
systems that use chemical signalling, where we can predict
and control behaviour between autonomous devices. If we
can understand the system as a game, then we can ask how
to modify the game in order to achieve a desired result. For
example, we could seek how to maintain a healthy system
state, how to mitigate disease, or how to efficiently allocate
resources for effective signalling. For the bacteria signalling
case study considered in this work, we could ask how to
facilitate cooperation (e.g., if the bacteria being modelled are
healthy for the human body) or how to encourage selfishness
(e.g., if the bacteria are infectious).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we summarize existing examples of games and
game-theoretic analysis in microbial systems. These games
highlight the relevance of real-time behavioural dynamics to
competition and cooperation. In Section III, we identify the
unique game properties that apply to real-time behavioural
dynamics in these environments. In Section IV, we demon-
strate the potential to study and control real-time behavioural
3dynamics through examples of bacteria quorum sensing and
cancer cell signalling. We study bacteria signalling as a case
study in Section V, and conclude in Section VI.
II. MICROSCOPIC SYSTEM DYNAMICS
Now we briefly discuss examples of game theoretic appli-
cations and related analysis in microscopic systems. These
examples demonstrate progress in understanding the complex
and dynamic interactions within and between microbial pop-
ulations, and enable us to draw inspiration to control the real-
time dynamics of such populations when they rely on noisy
signalling.
Generally, microbial environments are both diverse and
dynamic; they are often home to multiple species, including
bacteria and animal cells, and their populations can migrate
and evolve both spatially and temporally. There are many
examples of “games” where the players are living cells that
compete or cooperate with each other. A common refrain in
[5] is the importance of spatial heterogeneity; a homogeneous
model might predict that only a single behaviour survives,
whereas non-uniform spatial distributions can also lead to
system stability by providing suitable local interactions, i.e.,
the best behaviour for an individual cell depends on the actions
of its immediate neighbours. We now consider some examples.
A. Metabolic Games
There are different metabolic pathways for breaking down
sugars into usable energy, including respiration and fermenta-
tion. These pathways have different effective rates and differ-
ent efficiencies (e.g., fermentation is faster but less efficient).
We can view a cell’s pathway as its strategy, and it is possible
for a cell to switch pathways or use multiple pathways simul-
taneously. [5] reviewed games that sought to understand why
different pathways have evolved and how different pathways
can be maintained within a stable population. For example,
it has been shown that fermentation can be favoured in a
spatially homogeneous environment; each individual benefits
by consuming sugar as fast as it can. However, by accounting
for local interactions, it can be shown why and how a mixed
population of fermenters and respirators can coexist.
B. Tumor Growth
Recent research has used evolutionary game theory to un-
derstand the growth and progression of malignant tumours. [5]
reviewed games that modelled competition between healthy
and tumour cells, and between different types of tumour cells.
For example, a tumour can grow by having an equilibrium
between cells that are more effective at dividing and cells that
are more effective at moving.
In addition to metabolic games and tumour growth, [5]
considers how different variations of the same species take
turns dominating a population, how different species cooperate
to break down resources, and how cells send information with
pheromones. The sensitivity to spatial heterogeneity in all of
these cases suggests that molecular communication analysis
(which models noisy signal propagation between individuals)
is relevant for microscopic populations.
C. Quorum Sensing
A common mechanism for real-time local coordination
amongst bacteria is quorum sensing (QS). In QS, each bac-
terium both releases and detects signalling molecules to esti-
mate the population density. When the density is sufficient, the
bacteria initiate collaborative actions, such as biofilm forma-
tion. These actions require more effort from each bacterium
but can lead to a greater payoff for the community (i.e., a
higher chance of survival; see [11]). Furthermore, the study
of QS has applications beyond bacteria. For example, [12]
drew analogies between QS and the behaviour of tumours.
Generally, QS mechanisms can be quite complex. [3] de-
scribed many non-trivial signalling and behavioural dynamics
associated with QS, including the use of multiple types of
molecules, crosstalk between different species (see Fig. 2),
and eavesdropping by cells that do not release signalling
molecules. There are opportunities to model these scenarios as
games (as we also discuss later in this paper), and also to draw
inspiration from communication engineering concepts such
as network security and mitigating interference. Work that
has analysed signalling between bacteria as a game includes
[7], [13]. [7] studied the formation of links between pairs of
bacteria as a repeated game and whether a colony of connected
bacteria could form. [13] presented a cooperation game that
accounts for costs associated with cooperation and signalling
molecule generation. Existing analysis does not tend to model
physical molecular signals and their stochastic signalling dy-
namics, although they have been identified as important factors
to drive heterogeneity in microbial infections; see [14].
III. PROPERTIES OF REAL-TIME MICROSCOPIC GAMES
By focusing on the control of real-time behaviour under
noisy signalling, our proposed game theoretic approach has
features that are distinct from existing analysis of microscopic
systems. Here, we highlight both the unique properties of
the game theoretic components and the differences in how
solutions could be obtained.
A. Players
Microorganisms qualify as players, even though they are not
rational decision-makers. While many games in biology are
modelled at the population level, microscopic games that ac-
count for local interactions require that the game be modelled
at the level of individual cells. This was also needed for the
spatially heterogeneous games reviewed in [5]. Furthermore,
due to the limited intelligence of the individual microorgan-
isms and the impact of information uncertainty due to noisy
signalling via stochastic reaction-diffusion, we are interested in
games with players that have imperfect real-time information
about each other. For example, a microorganism will most
likely not know the precise number of players nor the actual
behaviour of each player (information via cell signalling may
be limited to only a few bits; see [15]). This is especially true
when the population changes, e.g., players enter or leave via
motility, cell division, and death. We also seek to manipulate
the propagation of the molecular communication signals so
that we can tune the perceived information and control the
players.
4B. Strategies
In biological systems, individual players are typically
treated in aggregate and one describes the distribution of
strategies in a population, e.g., what fraction is cooperating
and what fraction is cheating. For microscopic games, we
should also consider the spatial distribution of strategies, as
emphasized in [5]. Additionally, to be real-time, we seek
to model the dynamics of individual behaviour, where a
player might change its behaviour due to its ongoing (but
noisy) assessment of the environment. Individual dynamics
are common in general game theory (as repeated games; see
[16]). However, microscopic game theory problems usually
assume that a player’s behaviour is fixed and variations are
only achieved in future generations via mutations. Part of the
novelty of our approach is having a game where a microscopic
player’s strategy can change within its lifetime.
C. Payoffs
As in existing microscopic games (and in games more
generally), the payoffs in our approach are the net rewards that
players receive as the outcome of the game, as a function of
the strategies of all of the players. Whereas a player’s strategy
depends on perceived information about the system, which can
be incorrect, the payoffs depend on the actual current system
state. Nevertheless, to be relevant to our approach, a suitable
payoff model should include the following:
1) Accommodate the spatial distribution of players. For
example, the reward for a player that is adjacent to
a cheater may be less than that for a player that is
surrounded by cooperators.
2) Vary with time, both to model the temporal behaviour
of the players, and also to account for a dynamic
environment. For example, the players may consume a
resource that depletes and replenishes over time.
3) Impose a cost on a player changing its behaviour.
Obviously, different behaviours should have different
costs (e.g., cooperation is generally modelled to be more
resource intensive than cheating). However, it is also rea-
sonable for a player to spend resources in order to switch
from one behaviour to another. For microorganisms, this
could be represented as the time and energy needed to
alter gene expression.
4) Be tunable. We seek to control the environment by
altering the cost or the reward for particular behaviours.
For example, we might seek to make cooperation more
expensive in order to prevent the formation of a biofilm.
D. Solutions
Most biological games, including microscopic games, are
studied using evolutionary game theory; see [4], [5], [16].
This means that the solution of interest is the Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy (ESS), which is a distribution of strategies that
remains stable over generations of players. This framework is
consistent with a model where a player’s behaviour is fixed
over its lifetime.
For us to consider real-time games between dynamic mi-
croscopic players, the similar but distinct Nash Equilibrium
(NE) framework is more appropriate. When a NE is achieved,
no player can benefit by changing its strategy (unless, of
course, the game itself changes). Thus, from the context of
solutions, we are interested in how we could guide a microbial
population towards a particular NE or how we could convert a
desired system state into a NE. For example, if the conditions
leading to the formation of a tumour was a NE, then we might
seek to prevent this NE by making the requisite cooperation
between cancer cells a non-equilibrium state.
IV. SAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY AND
MOLECULAR COMMUNICATION TO MICROORGANISMS
In this section, we consider two practical systems where we
seek to integrate game theory and molecular communication to
control behavioural dynamics in microscopic populations. For
each system, we describe example games with both one and
multiple species. The first system considers quorum sensing
to achieve cooperation within a bacterial population. We
completed a preliminary study of this scenario with a simple
resource sharing game in [6], and we extend this model as a
case study in Section V. The second system considers signals
from tumour cells and their interactions with healthy tissue and
the immune system. The two systems demonstrate the breadth
of opportunities for integrating stochastic signal propagation
with game theory. Game theory enables us to model complex
interdependent behaviour, and molecular communication anal-
ysis enables us to describe the imperfect local information due
to stochastic signal propagation.
A. Application 1: Bacteria Signalling
We are particularly inspired by QS as an implementation
for communication between bacteria and are interested in its
influence on real-time behaviour. For the first example, we
consider a resource sharing game where the players are all
members of the same QS population, and then an eavesdrop-
ping game with multiple species where only one population
uses QS signals. Study of the corresponding models might
lead to improved strategies for combating antibiotic resistance
or improving the health of essential bacterial communities.
1) Resource Sharing Game: Consider a resource sharing
game where bacteria consume a common resource (e.g., food)
and they could work together to access the resource. For
example, the bacteria could cooperate to coordinate an attack
on a larger organism or to optimize nutrient extraction via
cross-feeding (see [5]). In QS, each bacterium estimates the
size of the population. We are interested in how the uncertainty
in the population (both size and state) affects the dynamics
of the population. If we assume that all bacteria behave in
their own interest, then any individual bacterium would only
commit the additional resources necessary for cooperation if
it would benefit from doing so, or if it “believes” that it would
benefit.
We considered a very simple model of this game in [6],
which included only some of the distinctive game properties
identified in this paper, and extend the model as a case study in
Section V. The results in [6] suggested that uncertainty in the
size and behaviour of the rest of the population can overcome
5a lack of explicit coordination and lead to cooperation. In
Section V, we add features to make the model more practical.
In particular, the payoffs depend on the local number of
bacteria and their behaviour, less information is available for
bacteria to infer the state of the population, and conditions are
established for bacteria to win or lose (i.e., succeed or die).
In other variations of this game, some bacteria might not
fully participate in the resource sharing process, either by
never releasing QS molecules or never cooperating. These
actions make them “free-riders” of any benefit from the co-
operating population. This has been observed experimentally
in mutants with no QS mechanism in [17], and is particularly
beneficial to a free-rider if the cost to transmit the QS signal or
the cost to cooperate is expensive. A bacterium can still benefit
from cooperation if there are still enough bacteria cooperating
in the quorum. However, the population estimation will be
perturbed and if there are too many free-riders then the bacteria
that are still signalling are wasting energy. Open questions
include (1) whether game theory can enable us to predict a
stable number of free-riders, and (2) whether mechanisms exist
to prevent too many bacteria from free-riding.
2) Inter-Species Eavesdropping Game: As we noted previ-
ously, QS can include signalling between different species and
enable one population to eavesdrop on another. For example,
[3] discussed how bacteria such as E. coli and even animals
such as C. elegans do not generate QS signals but can intercept
them from other species. Through “silent” observation, E. coli
can mount “stealth attacks” on hosts and C. elegans can be
both attracted to food sources and repelled by pathogens. With
these examples in mind, we can consider a game where the QS
bacteria have to also decide the strength of their QS signals. A
stronger signal can make achieving cooperation more reliable
but at the cost of making detection by other populations easier.
The members of the eavesdropping population have to decide
whether the noisy QS signal is sufficient to take action against
the QS bacteria population. Parameters of interest include
the size and proximity of these populations, as these would
influence the reliability of the signals as well as the payoffs.
We can consider whether the bacteria could be manipulated
to make them easier to detect and whether the eavesdropping
population can adjust its sensitivity to the QS signal to avoid
taking action and wasting energy when it is unnecessary.
B. Application 2: Tumor Cell Signalling
Our next application considers a more diverse environment
that includes cancer cells, healthy cells, and immune system
cells. Cancerous tumours are groups of cells that undergo
abnormal growth and can invade surrounding tissue. They
can eventually metastasise and spread throughout the body,
at which stage they are very difficult to treat. Thus, we
are particularly interested in the formation and behaviour
of premalignant tumours. For this application, we consider
a diffusion control game that is played by the tumour cell
population, and then a more complex game where we add
the immune system cells as players. The proposed games use
signalling and decision-making at the cellular level to gain
insight into cancer development and treatment.
Tumor Cells
Tissue Cells
Fig. 3. Signalling by tumour cells. Cancer tumour cells (shaded) are capable
of manipulating nearby healthy tissue cells (white) to produce infrastructure
that protects the tumour and shields it from detection by the immune system.
The signalling by the tumour to the tissue (represented by arrows with dashed
lines) results in a environment that has similarities to that achieved by bacteria
communities that create biofilms; see [12].
1) Diffusion Control Game: Tumours are more than just
cells that grow and divide without restraint; they are com-
plex communities that signal among themselves and with
the surrounding environment. As we previously noted, [12]
observed that evolutionary strategies used by bacteria can
also be identified within tumours. For example, when bacteria
create a biofilm, they increase their resistance to external
threats such as antibiotics but this also reduces the intake of
nutrients and oxygen. Tumour cells undergo a similar trade-off
when they stimulate surrounding cells to both produce more
extracellular matrix and increase their metabolic rates, which
simultaneously reduces access of molecules to the tumour via
diffusion (which reduces the ability of the immune system to
identify the cancerous cells via antigens) while maintaining
energy needs (see Fig. 3).
Along this direction, we could model tumour growth as a
diffusion control game where tumour cells choose whether to
stimulate the surrounding tissue, i.e., whether to reduce the
diffusion rate (which reduces the ambient nutrient levels but
decreases the chance of detection by the immune system).
The player model could include a tumour cell’s uncertainty
about its population size and its own location in the tumour
relative to the surrounding tissue. These parameters could be
estimated via molecular communication, i.e., inferred from the
concentrations of molecules in the vicinity of the player. The
payoff model could include the cost of signalling to the tissue
while showing the expected trade-off between detectability and
access to nutrients. This game could help us understand and
mitigate the conditions where healthy tissue supporting the
tumour is an attainable NE, for example by increasing the
cost needed to reliably communicate with the healthy tissue.
2) Competition with Immune System: We can extend the
diffusion control game by adding the immune system, which
provides both adaptive and innate protection against external
threats; see [18]. An initial game theoretic model in this
direction could consider the energy costs associated with
building an adaptive immune response versus the response’s
capacity to detect and fight cancer before a tumour can
metastasise. The dynamics of this model would include (1)
determining the number of adaptive cell players to respond to
6the detection of a tumour, (2) the strategy of each adaptive
immune cell to identify and respond to the tumour, and (3)
the tumour cells’ efforts to protect themselves and whether
they are able to detect the immune system’s behaviour. Each
of these components would rely on noisy observations of
propagating signals, e.g., the probability of tumour detection
would rely on how easily antigens can reach and identify the
tumour. Another work that considered this problem but not
within the context of a game is [19].
There is significant potential to explore this model, as [18]
reviewed epidemiological studies demonstrating that patients
with compromised adaptive immunity can be at a reduced
risk for some types of cancers, and environmental conditions
can actually prompt innate immune cells to promote tumour
growth by suppressing an adaptive response. This suggests that
individual immune cells can indeed be modelled as players
that could be manipulated to fight or support a tumour.
Furthermore, the model could be integrated with clinical tools
such as immunotherapy, where the adaptive immune system is
modified to improve immunity against a particular target; see
[20].
V. CASE STUDY: BACTERIA RESOURCE SHARING
We complete this paper with a case study of bacterial
signalling. The case study is a more practical extension of
our preliminary model in [6]. In particular, the entire game
is modelled at the level of individual bacteria (such that
payoffs are heterogeneous, even when bacteria have the same
behaviour), bacteria use a noisy estimate of their current payoff
to infer the state of the population, and bacteria can win or
lose (i.e., succeed or die) as the game progresses. It is still
a simple model, as we make many simplifying assumptions
about the bacteria and we use rudimentary means to account
for the signal propagation. Nevertheless, the model is sufficient
to obtain interesting results that are consistent with intuition.
In this section, we summarize the system model and corre-
sponding game, present and analyse simulation results, and
provide comments on future directions for the model. For
clarity of presentation, the full technical details of the model
are described in the Appendix.
A. Model and Game Summary
We consider a static population of bacteria players. Every
bacterium has an energy level; it gains energy from the
environment and spends energy to operate. A player can die
if it runs out of energy or succeed if it collects a sufficient
amount. By “succeed,” we mean that a player has sufficient
energy to survive or proliferate and no longer participates as
a formal player in the game.
We model the inter-dependence of players via the energy
collection process and in consideration of their proximity
because cell fitness has been shown to depend on cell density;
see [9]. The strategy of every player is to be either greedy
or cooperative. Greedy players require less energy than coop-
erators to operate. Generally, it is possible for proximity to
be either positive or negative for either cooperating or greedy
players; see [9] for examples and experiments demonstrating
each case. In this case study, we allow cooperative players
to benefit by being close to each other (because they work
together to improve resource access) whereas greedy players
benefit by being separated (because they compete for resource
access).
The heterogeneity in the energy collection model also
drives asymmetry in the distribution of behaviour. The players
estimate the amount of collected energy; this estimate can also
be corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The
estimate is used to infer the size and behaviour of the total
population by assuming that all other players are nearby and
have homogeneous behaviour. From these inferences, a player
compares its potential energy income from either behaviour
and switches if it is both beneficial to do so and if the player
can afford a “switching fee”.
The game is played in multiple rounds. In every round, each
player has its energy updated and it estimates the population
state to determine its behaviour in the following round. The
rounds continue until all the players are starved or successful,
or until a maximum number of rounds has occurred.
B. Results and Discussion
We now consider simulations of the proposed game. We
simulate the game where we randomly place the bacteria
over a square region and they remain fixed for the rounds
of that game. The system model parameters are configured as
shown in Table I in the Appendix. Each game begins with
50 cooperative and 50 greedy bacteria, and every player re-
estimates the state of the population (i.e., size and behaviour)
in every round.
Since we are interested in the behavioural dynamics, we
seek to characterize the changes in behaviour as the game
progresses, the eventual number of starved and successful
players, and which behaviour led to starvation or success.
Thus, for each configuration we plot the number of playing,
starved, and successful players of each behaviour as a function
of the game round. Games are repeated (and locations re-
generated) 100 times and all curves show the state of the
players averaged over all games. Error bars show one standard
deviation and are omitted when the standard deviation is less
than 0.5 players.
In this preliminary analysis, we focus on three features.
First, we set the average population density by controlling
the size of the square region over which the bacteria are
distributed. Second, we set whether the switching costs are
sufficiently low to enable switching (if not, then the system
progresses without an actual game being played). Finally, we
set whether the collected energy is observed perfectly or with
AWGN.
We consider a low average population density in Figs. 4, 5,
and 6, where the players are distributed over a square of length
100µm. Based on our model, we expect that greedy behaviour
would be more successful. This is confirmed in Fig. 4, where
the players are prevented from switching their behaviours.
The greedy players all succeed within 8 rounds, whereas the
cooperative players are all dead within 25 rounds. When the
switching costs are lowered, as considered in Fig. 5, all of
7Fig. 4. Behaviour with low density and no switching. The cooperative
players all die and the greedy players all succeed.
Fig. 5. Game with low density. All players become greedy and succeed.
the players switch to greedy and eventually succeed. However,
when we then introduce AWGN to the population estimation in
Fig. 6, a few initially cooperative players stay cooperative but
they all die. These observations are all consistent with one of
the underlying motivations for quorum sensing; bacteria waste
energy if they engage in expensive cooperative behaviour when
the population is too sparse.
We consider a high average population density in Figs. 7,
8, and 9, where the players are distributed over a square of
length 10µm. Based on our model, we expect to see successful
cooperators. This is confirmed in Fig. 7, where the players are
prevented from switching their behaviours. Nevertheless, the
dynamics are more interesting than in the low density case.
A clear majority of cooperative players become successful,
but they are also able to support a majority of the greedy
players to also succeed. Interestingly, a small fraction of both
subpopulations dies. This can occur in a local area where a
cooperator is isolated or where too many greedy players are
Fig. 6. Game with low density and estimation with AWGN. Most players
become greedy and eventually succeed; players that stay cooperative die.
Fig. 7. Behaviour with high density and no switching. Most players even-
tually succeed, albeit slowly, and some players (both greedy and cooperative)
die.
close together.
When the switching costs are lowered in the high population
density case, as considered in Fig. 8, all of the players
cooperate and quickly succeed. We also observe this for any
initial behaviour distribution (i.e., players switch to cooperate
even when they are all greedy; not shown). However, when
we then introduce AWGN to the population estimation in
Fig. 9, most players succeed within 50 rounds but a significant
fraction (on average about 20%) remain greedy. From our
simple case study model, we see that noisy signalling infor-
mation is sufficient to both create and maintain heterogeneous
behavioural dynamics.
Finally, in Fig. 10 we test two of the questions raised by
the high density results. First, are cooperators essential for
the survival of greedy players? In Fig. 10(a), we initialize
the players to be greedy and prevent switching. Most players
quickly die and some that survive eventually succeed. Thus,
8Fig. 8. Game with high density. All players cooperate and succeed.
Fig. 9. Game with high density and estimation with AWGN. Most players
eventually succeed, including players that remained greedy (about 20% of the
total population).
the greedy players in a dense environment need cooperative
players so they can free-ride. Second, can greed still emerge
in a population that is initially fully cooperative? In Fig. 10(b),
we observe the greedy behaviour when the population is
initialized with cooperative players that make population es-
timates with AWGN. About 5% of the population becomes
greedy due to the noisy estimation, and as in Figs. 7 and 9
they are able to succeed by free-riding off of the cooperators.
C. Future Directions
This simple case study has many opportunities for further
extension. We suggest some of these here, any of which
could be integrated within the current framework. In particular,
we could model molecule propagation with more precision,
i.e., by explicitly including the stochastic reaction-diffusion
dynamics that accompany low local molecule concentrations.
Other uncertain quantities for individual players might include
Fig. 10. Games with uniform initial behaviour. High density environment
where (a) all players are forcibly greedy; (b) all players initially cooperate
but estimate density with AWGN.
the environment resource level or the local quantity of stored
energy. In terms of the system model, we could consider
environments with heterogeneous types of players, each with
their own selection of strategies. More complex strategies
might include player mobility (e.g., to move towards a food
source), additional types of signals (e.g., for parallel estimation
and coordination), and reproduction.
In terms of the analysis, we could consider the impact of dif-
ferent initial player distributions or the size of the population.
In particular, we are interested in scaling up the populations
by at least a few orders of magnitude. This section focused on
monitoring the behaviour distribution as games progressed; we
could alternatively consider the system equilibrium or the time
until equilibrium as a function of the system parameters, such
as the costs. We could also monitor the specific locations of
the players in addition to their individual behaviour. Last but
not least, we seek optimization problems and analytical results,
including game theoretical analysis, to support the simulations
and provide additional insight into the control of microscopic
populations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we identified opportunities to integrate game
theoretic modelling with noisy signalling for real-time be-
havioural dynamics in microscopic environments. Integrating
game theory and molecular communication can help us under-
stand and possibly manipulate the competitive dynamics at a
physical scale that accounts for the actions taken by individual
cells. We identified how game theoretic models based on
our approach are distinct from existing microscopic games
in that they account for both real-time and local behaviour
with noisy information. We presented bacteria resource sharing
and tumour cell signalling as two sample applications whose
analysis and understanding could benefit from this integrated
approach and potentially lead to control. In particular, we used
a simple bacteria resource sharing game as a case study with
9TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS USED IN SECTION V. ENERGY AND COST
PARAMETERS HAVE ARBITRARY UNITS.
Parameter Symbol Value
# of Realizations per Game – 100
Population Size N 100
Resource Strength R 1
Initial Energy E0 50
Starving Energy El 0
Success Energy Eu 100
Operating Cost {cc, cg} {5, 1}
Individual Conversion Factor {αc, αg} {1, 10}
Inter-Player Conversion Factor {βc,c, βc,g,
βg,c, βg,g}
{10, 5,−5,
−10}µm2
Nominal Minimum Distance dmin 2µm
Behaviour Switching Cost {sc, sg} {20, 10}
an analytical model and simulations. We anticipate that many
other microscopic scenarios could also benefit.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we present the detailed system model of
the bacteria signalling case study in Section V and describe
how a game proceeds. We also list all of the parameter values
used in the simulations in Table I.
A. System Model
A population A of N bacteria is uniformly distributed
over an environment. The environment provides an ambient
resource strength R. The jth bacterium is a player with energy
Ej that will starve if its energy reduces to El and succeed if
its energy increases to Eu.
Time progresses through a series of rounds of arbitrary
length. In practice, a round should be on the order of the time
required to modify gene expression (i.e., minutes or hours;
see [21]), and much longer than the typical time for signalling
molecules to diffuse across the population (i.e., seconds for
a microscale population). In the mth round, the energy is
updated as
Ej [m] = Ej [m− 1] + rj [m]− c, (1)
where Ej [0] = E0, rj [m] = f(R) is the reward to the jth
player, and c is the cost in energy for the player to maintain
its current behaviour. A player can be cooperative or greedy.
Cooperation is more expensive than greed, i.e., cc > cg. We
scale the reward rj by a cooperation scaling factor γj , such
that
rj [m] = γj [m]R, (2)
where γj depends on the behaviour of all of the players. Cell
fitness has been shown to depend on the proximity of other
cells; see [9]. A simple model that accounts for this is
γj [m] = αj +
∑
k∈A/j
βk,j
(dk,j + dmin)2
, (3)
where a player’s individual capacity (αj) to convert the
resource to energy is added to the impact of all of the
other players in the population A. The individual conversion
capacity can take values αj ∈ {αc, αg}, depending on whether
the player is cooperative or greedy, respectively. βk,j is a
measure of how the kth player’s behaviour affects the energy
conversion of the jth player. dk,j is the distance between the
jth and kth players, and dmin is a nominal minimum distance
that we choose to be about the size of a player. Thus, the
impact of another player is inversely proportional to the square
of the distance to that player. We choose this because the
propagation time of a diffusing molecule increases with the
square of the distance; see [22].
The inter-player conversion βk,j can take values βa,b, where
a ∈ {c, g} is the behaviour of the kth player and b ∈ {c, g} is
the behaviour of the jth player. In this case study, we choose
the cooperation scaling factor γj so that cooperative players
benefit by being close to each other whereas greedy players
benefit by being separated.
Thus, to achieve the desired impact of proximity on the
cooperation scaling factor in (3), we impose that βc,c > 0,
βc,g > 0, βg,g < 0, and βg,c < 0, i.e., a cooperative player
always improves the conversion of nearby players and a greedy
player always degrades the conversion of nearby players. The
relative values are tunable, but in this work we consider that
βc,c > βc,g (i.e., a player will receive a greater reward due to
a cooperator if it also cooperates) and that βg,g < βg,c (i.e.,
a cooperating player is more resilient to the presence of a
greedy player). Furthermore, we assume that a starved player
(energy below El) is dead and no longer has an impact on the
energy conversion of the other players, whereas a successful
player (energy above Eu) continues the behaviour that made
it successful, such that it affects other players as if it were still
playing.
While (3) may be a reasonable approximation for how
bacterial players affect each other, it would be unreasonable
to expect that the players could accurately evaluate (3) with
perfect information about the environment. In particular, a
bacterium would not have perfect knowledge of the location
and behaviour of all other bacteria in the population, although
it may be able to infer some information from the propagation
of signalling molecules; see [15]. To keep things simple in
this case study, we assume that each bacterium makes a
noisy estimate of γj [m], γˆj [m], that is impaired by zero-
mean Additive White Gaussian Noise with variance equal to
γj [m]. From γˆj [m], the player estimates the population size
by assuming that the behaviour of the rest of the population is
homogeneous and that all players are adjacent, i.e., dk,j = 0.
From (3), the population estimate Nˆj [m] is then
Nˆj [m] =
(γˆj [m]− αj)d2min
βk,j
, (4)
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where the inter-player conversion βk,j depends on the player’s
current behaviour and the sign of (γˆj [m]−αj), i.e., if (γˆj [m]−
αj) is positive, then the player assumes that the rest of the
population is cooperative.
B. Game Formulation
The proposed game proceeds as follows. In every round,
each player makes it own estimate Nˆj [m] of the population
size. It then decides whether to switch from its current be-
haviour by comparing the payoff in (1) as a greedy player and
that as a cooperative player, assuming that all other (estimated)
players would follow the same behaviour. This comparison
includes the cost c associated with each behaviour. If a player
decides to switch behaviours in order to increase its payoff,
then it also has to pay a switching cost. sc is the cost to switch
from greedy to cooperative, and sg is the cost to switch from
cooperative to greedy. We do not include the switching cost
when determining the preferred behaviour, such that players
try to optimize their long-term behaviour, but we prevent a
switch if the player would choose to switch but has insufficient
energy to do so (i.e., if the switch would bring its energy
level below El). The rounds continue until all the players are
starved or successful, or until a maximum number of rounds
has occurred.
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